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Abstract
The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mecha-
nism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual
does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (1993) that
this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach rst-best al-
locations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity
of Piketty's critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that
the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian
income tax system.
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We study a model with n individuals who produce output and consume a private good. As in the
Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation, these individuals dier in their productive abilities
and it is desirable that more able individuals produce more output, while marginal utilities of
consumption should be equalized. Moreover, individuals are privately informed about their
productive abilities. We seek to characterize the optimal mechanism which species, for each
individual, an output requirement and a consumption level both as a function of the individual's
type and the types of all other individuals. Our main result provides conditions so that (i) the
optimal mechanism is a simple mechanism in the sense that the outcome for any one individual
depends only on the characteristics of that individual, irrespectively of what the characteristics
of other individuals are, and (ii) the optimal mechanism is equivalent to an optimal Mirrleesian
income tax.
Our main assumption is that the productive abilities of dierent individuals are independent
and identically distributed random variables. Also, our mechanism design approach is based
on a condition of budget balance in expectation, i.e., it is required that the expected level of
output per capita is not less than the expected level of consumption per capita. With a given
nite number of individuals, the Mirrleesian income tax may therefore violate the public sector
budget constraint, provided that budget balance holds on average. However, we show that,
as the number of individuals grows without limit, the law of large numbers implies that the
probability of a budget surplus or decit converges to zero.
Thus, the main conclusion of our analysis is that, in a large economy, there is no mechanism
which outperforms the Mirrleesian income tax. The result extends to a small economy if budget
balance is required on average, but not if budget balance is required for all states that occur
with positive probability.
This result is of interest because the existing literature is unclear with respect to the interpre-
tation of the Mirrleesian income tax model from a mechanism design perspective. In particular,
there have been interpretations based on a model with a nite number of individuals, and inter-
pretations based on a model with a continuum of individuals, which give rise to very dierent
conclusions.
More specically, for a continuum economy, it has been shown by Hammond (1979) and
Guesnerie (1995) that the Mirrleesian income tax problem is equivalent to a model of optimal
mechanism design. For a model with a nite number of individuals, it has been shown by Dierker
and Haller (1990) that the Mirrleesian problem is equivalent to a model of mechanism design in
which attention is restricted to simple mechanisms. For this model, Piketty (1993) has shown
that the focus on simple mechanisms involves a substantial loss of generality. First-best welfare
optima, including the utilitarian one, can be reached with mechanisms that exploit the option
to make the outcome for an individual i dependent on the behavior of some other individual
j. These outcomes are out of reach with simple mechanisms, or, equivalently, with income tax
schedules.1
1Hamilton and Slutsky (2007) extend Piketty's result. They show that his results remain valid if budget
1Piketty's work challenges the approach by Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995). Most
economists view an analysis with a continuum of individuals as useful only to the extent that it
provides an approximation of the outcomes that would be obtained with a large nite economy.
If the results for a nite economy (rst-best is possible) are fundamentally dierent from the
results for a continuum economy (rst-best is out of reach), this casts doubt on the plausibility
of a model with a continuum of individuals.
The Mirrleesian income tax problem is appealing to many researchers because { in contrast
to Ramsey models of taxation which are theoretically interesting only if lump sum taxes are as-
sumed unavailable { it limits the role of a priori assumptions on admissible policies. Now, what
are the a priori assumptions in the Mirrleesian model? According to Dierker and Haller (1990)
attention is restricted to simple mechanism. Piketty's result then leads us to the conclusion that
the Mirrleesian policy problem is somewhat contrived because without this restriction we could
reach rst-best. The Mirrleesian approach to optimal taxation is therefore subject to the same
criticism as Ramsey models of taxation: The policy problem is interesting only because of ad
hoc restrictions on the set of available policy instruments.
The present paper introduces an alternative model of a nite economy. With this model, the
problems above do not arise. In particular, the optimal mechanism in the nite economy is
shown to be a simple mechanism which is equivalent to an optimal income tax. This result
does not depend on the number of individuals. The only dierence between an economy with
a nite number of n individuals, and the limit outcome that is obtained as n ! 1 is that,
due to the law of large numbers, in the \limit economy" budget balance holds in a strict, ex
post sense, whereas in the nite economy budget balance holds only in a weak, ex ante sense.
This observation also implies that a model based on a large, but nite number of individuals
gives approximately the same results as a model with a continuum of individuals, and therefore
provides a justication for the latter approach.2
The crucial dierence between our model and the one by Dierker and Haller (1990) and
Piketty (1993) is as follows: Dierker and Haller (1990) and Piketty (1993) consider a nite
economy in which the cross-section distribution of productive abilities is predetermined and
commonly known. For instance, in an economy with two individuals, one individual is known
to be high-skilled and one individual is known to be low-skilled. It is, however, unknown
whether person 1 or person 2 is the high-skilled person. In particular, this implies that if the
mechanism designer has learned person 1's type, she automatically knows person 2's type. More
generally, any one individual is informationally small in the sense that access to the privately
held information of n   1 individuals reveals the last individual's privately held information.
In our model, by contrast, individual skill-levels are drawn independently. Knowing the
type of person 1 therefore does not contain information about the type of person 2. Likewise,
observing the types of n   1 individuals reveals nothing about the type of the last individual.
balance is also required out-of-equilibrium.
2A recent literature uses models of mechanism design with a continuum of individuals in order to characterize
optimal insurance contracts or tax systems; see, for example, Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Bassetto
and Phelan (2008), or Kocherlakota and Phelan (2009).
2As a consequence, the cross-section distribution of types is itself a random quantity. In a model
with two individuals it could well be the case that both of them turn out to be high-skilled
or that both of them turn out to be low-skilled. However, we show that, as the number of
individuals becomes larger, by the law of large numbers, the cross-section distribution of types
converges to the probability distribution from which types are drawn. For instance, if each
individual is high-skilled and low-skilled with equal probability, then, in a large nite economy,
the population share of high-skilled individuals equals 1
2, almost surely.
The fact that our information structure is dierent from Piketty's does not yet imply that
the restriction to simple mechanisms is without loss of generality. In fact, the optimality of
simple mechanisms requires an additional assumption on the risk attitudes of individuals. The
logic is as follows. With non-simple mechanisms, we can make the outcome for some individual
i dependent on the types of all other individuals. From individual i's perspective, the types
of other individuals are random. The question, then, is whether an optimal mechanism should
provide full insurance of individual i against the randomness in the types of other individuals.
Under an assumption of decreasing risk aversion, we show that the answer to this question is
\yes". This is the key step in our proof that simple mechanisms are optimal.
The desirability of \full insurance against the risk in other individuals' types" can be ex-
plained as follows. When dealing with individual i, the mechanism faces an equity-eciency
trade-o. The equity concern implies that she would like i's consumption to be independent of
i's type. The eciency concern implies that i should work more if he is more productive. A
necessary condition for the desirability of non-simple mechanisms is that this trade-o becomes,
from the mechanism designer's perspective, more favorable { in the sense that additional con-
sumption of low-skilled types could be obtained at a lower welfare cost { if individual i is exposed
to randomness. The trade-o would become more favorable if such randomness created slack
in the incentive constraints of the very productive types of individual i so as to create room for
additional consumption of the less productive types of individual i. However, with decreasing
risk aversion, such randomness introduces additional slack only in the incentive constraints of
the less productive types, if anything. Given that these constraints are not binding anyway,
nothing is gained by having outcomes for any one individual being dependent on the outcomes
of other individuals.
Our proof of these statements builds on a proof of Hellwig (2007b) who studies the desir-
ability of randomized income taxation, or in the parlance of this paper, of stochastic simple
mechanism. For the proof of our main result, we show that the arguments which imply that
stochastic simple mechanisms cannot outperform deterministic simple mechanisms also imply
that non-simple mechanism cannot outperform simple mechanisms.
The remainder is organized as follows. The next section describes the environment. Section
3 denes the Mirrleesian income tax problem. In Section 4, we review Piketty's critique of
the Mirrleesian model. Our main result is in Section 5. The last section contains concluding
remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
32 The environment
There is a nite set of individuals, denoted by I = f1;:::;ng. Individual i has a utility function
Ui = U(ci;yi;wi) ;
where ci is i's consumption of a private good, or after-tax income, yi is the contribution to
the economy's output, or pre-tax-income, and wi is a productivity parameter, which is private
information of individual i. We assume throughout that U is twice continuously dierentiable,
and that the partial derivatives satisfy Uc > 0, and Uy < 0. We also assume that U is strictly
quasiconcave in ci and yi.
For each individual i, the productivity parameter wi belongs to a nite ordered set of possible
productivity parameters W = fw1;w2;:::;wmg. A higher productivity parameter is associated
with a lower disutility from productive eort; i.e., we assume that the single crossing condition
is satised: For every point (c;y) 2 R2








Finally, we assume that, under a rst-best allocation, each individual's productive eort is
positive. More formally, given k 2 f1;:::;mg, let
(ckf(v);ykf(v)) := argmin(c;y)2R2
+ c   y s.t. U(c;y;wk) = v :
Then, ykf(v) > 0.
3 The Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation
We introduce the Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation as a benchmark which facilitates
the interpretation of the results from the mechanism design analysis below. The Mirrleesian
model is as follows: individuals choose how much to work and thereby face an income tax
schedule T : R+ ! R that relates their pre-tax-income to their after-tax-income; i.e., they solve
the following utility maximization problem,
maxc;y U(c;y;wi) s.t. c  y   T(y) :
We denote by (C(wi j T);Y (wi j T)) the pair which solves this utility maximization problem.
An income tax T is said to be feasible if aggregate tax revenues are non-negative,
m X
k=1
fkT(Y (wk j T))  r ;
where f = (f1;:::;fm) is a probability distribution with support W, and r is an exogenous
revenue requirement.
At this stage, two dierent interpretations of the public sector budget constraint, and of
the probability distribution f are possible. One interpretation is that fk equals the population
share of individuals with skill level wk. An alternative interpretation is that fk is the probability
that any one individual has a skill level of wk. The latter interpretation gives rise to a weaker
4interpretation of the budget balance condition, namely as the requirement that expected tax
revenues must be sucient to nance the resource requirement. We will argue later that, with
a large number of individuals, both interpretations are essentially equivalent.
The Mirrleesian income tax problem can now be stated as follows: choose (Ck;Y k)m
k=1 in





subject to the constraints that there is a function T so that, for every k,




fk(Y k   Ck)  r : (2)
The taxation principle3 implies that the constraints in (1) can be written in a way that no longer
involves an explicit reference to a tax schedule T. According to this result, (Ck;Y k)m
k=1 satises
(1), for some income tax schedule T, if and only if it satises the following Mirrleesian incentive
compatibility constraints: For every pair k;l,
U(Ck;Y k;wk)  U(Cl;Y l;wk) : (3)
Assumption 1 (Non-decreasing marginal costs of public funds)
Let S(r) be the level of welfare that is induced by a solution to the Mirrleesian income tax
problem. We assume that, for all r, S00
(r)  0.
A marginal increase of the revenue requirement r in the government budget constraint yields a
welfare loss with absolute value equal to  S0
(r). Assumption 1, which will be important for
the proof of our main result, says that this welfare loss is a non-decreasing function of r.4
4 Piketty's critique of the Mirrleesian model
In the following, we will briey review the critique of the Mirrleesian income tax model that is due
to Piketty (1993). Piketty's work is based on the interpretation of the probability distribution
f as a commonly known cross-section distribution of productive abilities.
To illustrate his approach we focus on a simple setup with two individuals, I = f1;2g,






. Note that the information structure is such that, from an outsider's
perspective, one individual is known to be high-skilled and one individual is known to be low-
skilled. However, the outsider does not know whether individual 1 or individual 2 is the high-
skilled individual.
3See Hammond (1979) or Guesnerie (1995) for a proof.
4Assumption 1 could be traced back to assumptions about the primitives of the model, in particular of the
utility function U; see Bierbrauer and Boyer (2010) for an example. Here, this would lead us astray.





, where u is increasing and concave function and v is increasing and convex. Under
these assumptions, the rst-best utilitarian allocation consists of an consumption-output com-
bination for the low-skilled individual, A1 = (C1;Y 1), and one for the high-skilled individual
A2 := (C2;Y 2) which satises the following properties: (i) marginal utilities of consumption
are equalized, implying that C1 = C2 =: C, and (ii) for each individual, the marginal utility of













In particular, this implies that the high-skilled individual generates more output than the low-
skilled individual: Y 2 > Y 1.
Piketty's critique of the Mirrleesian optimal income tax problem is the following: this rst-
best allocation is not Mirrleesian incentive compatible.5 However, it can be reached with a more
general mechanism design approach. To demonstrate this, consider the following mechanism:
Each individual sends a message from the set W = fw1;w2g. Let ( ^ w1; ^ w2) be a typical pair
of messages by individuals 1 and 2, and let Ai( ^ w1; ^ w2) be the consumption-eort pair that
individual i gets as a function of the message prole.
Suppose these consumption-eort pairs satisfy the following properties: (i) If one individual
declares to be high-skilled and one individual declares to be low-skilled, the former gets the
bundle A1, and the latter gets the bundle A2, (ii) if both individuals declare to be low-skilled
both individuals get the bundle A11, (iii) if both individuals declare to be high-skilled both
individuals get the bundle A22. It is easy to verify that, if A11 and A22 are chosen as in Figure
1, then truth-telling is a dominant strategy, which implies that in equilibrium the rst-best
allocation is reached.
More generally, Piketty shows that for an economy with n individuals and a given cross-
section distribution of types, one can construct a game so that the rst-best utilitarian alloca-
tion is the unique equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. His
approach uses the possibility to make outcomes for one individual dependent on the behavior of
the other individual. To see this, note, e.g., that A1(w1;w2) = A1 6= A1(w1;w1) = A11. Now,
if we impose the restriction that such an interdependence must not arise, then there is a bundle
A1 = (C1;Y 1) that an individual gets whenever it communicates a low-skill level, irrespectively
of what the other individual communicates, and a bundle A2 = (C2;Y 2) that an individual gets
whenever it communicates a high-skill level. Following Dierker and Haller (1990), we refer to
mechanisms with this property in the following as simple. It is straightforward to verify that, for
the game induced by such a simple mechanism, truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium
if and only if (Ck;Y k)2
k=1 satises the Mirrleesian incentive compatibility constraints in (3).































21. The indierence curve of a high-skilled individual through A
2 is denoted by I
22
2 .
Piketty's result suggests that the Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation lacks a the-
oretical foundation. Given that superior mechanism exist, it is ultimately unclear why, for the
purposes of a normative analysis, attention should be restricted to simple mechanisms.
Our plan in the following is to look at this problem from a dierent angle. In particular, we
introduce an alternative model of a nite economy. The essential dierence to Piketty's model
is the following: in Piketty's analysis, each individual is informationally small. Given that the
cross-section distribution f is assumed to be known, if the mechanism designer has already
gained access to the privately held information of n   1 individuals about their productive
abilities, he can infer the last individual's productivity level. By contrast, we will assume that
the productivity level of any one individual i can not be inferred from information about the
productivity levels of all other individuals.
With this model we can show that, with an arbitrary, nite number of n individuals, the
optimal mechanism satisfying a feasibility condition and a Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
condition is equivalent to an optimal income tax in the Mirrlees-model. Our constraints are
weaker than those imposed by Piketty. We use a weaker notion of incentive compatibility, and a
requirement of budget balance in expectation rather than an ex post budget balance condition.
This makes the observation that the optimal mechanism is equivalent to an optimal income tax
even more striking.
5 A nite economy with independent private values
We study the environment in Section 2 under additional assumptions. First, we assume that
the individuals' productivity levels are realizations of independent and identically distributed
random variables with distribution f = (f1;:::;fk); i.e., fk is now interpreted as the probability
7of the event that wi = wk, for any one individual i. Second, we make the following assumptions
about preferences:
Assumption 2 (Desirability of Redistribution)
a) The utility function U is concave in y and satises Uy(c;y;wl) > Uy(c;y;wk) for l > k.
b) Let l > k. Let (cl;yl) 2 R2
+ and (ck;yk) 2 R2
+ be such that
cl > ck; Uc(cl;yl;wl)   Uy(cl;yl;wl) and Uc(ck;yk;wk) =  Uy(ck;yk;wk) :
Then,  Uy(cl;yl;wl) <  Uy(ck;yk;wk).
Assumption 3 (Decreasing Risk Aversion)
Let ~ c, and ~ y be a pair of nondegenerate nonegative-valued random variables. Let l > k. For
any  2 R, let E[U(~ c; ~ y;wk)] = U(E[~ c]   ;E[~ y];wk). Then,  > 0 and E[U(~ c; ~ y;wl)] 
U(E[~ c]   ;E[~ y];wl).
Assumption 2 describes situations in which it is desirable to change output requirements so
that high-skilled individuals work more and low-skilled individuals work less.6 Part a) states
that if a high-skilled and a low-skilled individual are pooled so that they both consume the
same and provide the same output, then utilitarian welfare goes up if output requirements are
rearranged. Part b) extends this to rst-best allocations with the property that high-skilled
individuals consume more than low-skilled individuals, and to second-best allocation where
the high-skilled individual's marginal disutility of output provision is even lower than with an
undistorted rst-best allocation.
Assumption 3 formalizes a concept of decreasing risk aversion, with risk premia measured
in units of the consumption good.7 The assumption says that, if an individual of some given
skill level is indierent between a lottery over consumption-output bundles and a deterministic
consumption-output-bundle { in which the output component is equal to the expected level
of output under the lottery {, then an individual with a high-skill level will not prefer the
deterministic bundle over the lottery.
Hellwig (2007b) shows that these two assumptions have the following implications. First,
for the Mirrleesian income tax problem dened in Section 3, one may without loss of generality
limit attention to a subset of the Mirrleesian incentive compatibility constraints, namely to the
Mirrleesian downward incentive compatibility constraints: for every pair k and every h < k,
u(Ck;Y k;wk)  u(Ch;Y h;wk) : (4)
A solution of the relaxed Mirrleesian problem which takes only these constraints into account
satises the neglected upward incentive compatibility constraints automatically. Second, the
6For a more extensive discussion of this assumption and its relation to alternative assumptions that have been
made in the literature on optimal income taxation, see Hellwig (2007a).
7See Hellwig (2007b) for more details.
8option to assign stochastic rather than deterministic consumption-output-bundles to individuals,
does not yield a higher level of utilitarian welfare and will hence not be used.
5.1 The mechanism design problem
Our main result will be that the optimal Mirrleesian income tax solves a mechanism design
problem with no a priori restrictions on the set of admissible mechanisms. Before we can state
this result, we rst need to dene this mechanism design problem.
We appeal to the revelation principle and limit attention to direct mechanisms that possess
truth-telling equilibria. We use Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. Let w =
(w1;:::;wn) be a prole of productivity levels. A direct mechanism species a pair of outcome
functions ci : w 7! ci(w) and yi : w 7! yi(w), for each individual i 2 I. Truth-telling is a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium provided that the following Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility constraints are
satised: For each i, for each k and for each l,
Ew i[U(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wk)]  Ew i[U(ci(w i;wl);yi(w i;wl);wk)] : (5)







 0 : (6)
This budget condition is weaker than one requiring budget balance in an ex post sense, so that,
for every w,
Pn
i=1(yi(w)   ci(w))  0. However, we will show below (see Section 5.4), that,
under an optimal mechanism, the probability of the event
Pn
i=1(yi(w)   ci(w)) 6= 0 converges
to zero, as n ! 1.
The mechanism design problem is to choose the functions (ci)n
i=1 and (yi)n
i=1 in order to
maximize expected utilitarian welfare, ES := Ew [
Pn
i=1 U(ci(w);yi(w);wi)], subject to the con-
straints in (5) and (6).
5.2 The main result
Proposition 1





solution to the mechanism design problem in Section 5.1. Then, for every k 2 f1;:::;mg,
there exists (Ck;Y k) 2 R2
+ so that, for every i, wi = wk implies that
(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk)) = (Ck;Y k) ;
for every w i 2 Wn 1.
ii) The optimal mechanism is an optimal income tax. The collection (Ck;Y k)m
k=1
solves the Mirrleesian income tax problem in Section 3.
9The proof of the main result builds on the proof in Hellwig (2007b) that random income tax
schedules cannot outperform deterministic ones. More specically, we rst focus on a relaxed
mechanism design problem where, for each individual i, only downward Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility constraints are imposed. Given that these are the only incentive constraints that
are taken into account, we show that non-simple mechanisms cannot outperform simple mech-
anisms.
The key step in the proof of this statement is the following. Any individual i is willing to
pay a risk premium for being insured against the uctuations in w i. Hence, if we start from
an non-simple mechanism that is downward Bayes-Nash incentive compatible and replace it
by a simple mechanism so that every individual's expected output level remains the same and
every individuals' expected utility level remains the same, we can reduce expected consumption
levels and create a surplus in the feasibility constraint (6). Moreover, because of decreasing
risk aversion, type wl of individual i considers the consumption-output-combination for type
wk under the new, simple mechanism to be less attractive than under the old, non-simple
mechanism. Hence, the newly constructed simple mechanism is also downward Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible.
This implies that, as long as we limit attention to downward incentive constraints, focussing
on simple mechanisms involves no further loss of generality. Given that with simple mechanisms
outcomes for dierent individuals are linked only via the budget constraint and that simple
mechanisms are equivalent to income tax schedules, the relaxed mechanism design problem can
now be decomposed into a number of subproblems: rst, there is a separate subproblem for each
individual i: choose a simple mechanism (Ck
i ;Y k
i )m
k=1 that satises the downward Mirrleesian




i ) = Ti. Second,
choose the expected tax payments of dierent individuals (Ti)n
i=1 in a welfare-maximizing way,
subject to the constraint that
Pn
i=1 Ti  0.
An individual's subproblem is in fact a relaxed Mirrleesian income tax problem with a revenue
requirement of Ti. It follows from the analysis of the relaxed Mirrleesian income tax problem in
Hellwig (2007b) that the solution to each individual's subproblem is also upward incentive com-
patible. This proves that the optimal simple mechanism that is downward incentive compatible,
is also upward incentive compatible, and therefore is a solution to the \full" mechanism design
problem.
The last step in the proof is to verify that the optimal simple mechanism is in fact symmetric
or anonymous. A utilitarian mechanism designer chooses the revenue requirements of dierent
individuals so that the marginal impact on expected utility levels is equalized. Assumption 1
implies that this is achieved only if each individual faces the same revenue requirement.
5.3 Robustness and Dominant Strategies
The optimal mechanism satises the Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility constraints. However,
the fact that the optimal mechanism is a simple mechanism implies that it also satises the
more demanding ex post incentive compatibility constraints: For each i, for each k, for each l,
10and for each w i,
U(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wk)  U(ci(w i;wl);yi(w i;wl);wk) : (7)
These constraints can be interpreted as follows: suppose that individual i has learned what the
types of the other individuals are. Then, whatever these types are, individual i's best response
still is to communicate the own type truthfully to the mechanism designer. Put dierently, from
an ex post perspective where the individuals'private information has become public, no type of
individual i regrets to have revealed himself to the mechanism designer.
A simple mechanism trivially satises these constraints, because the outcome for individual
i is the same irrespectively of what the types of other individuals are. In fact, this implies that
truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Consequently, the results of our analysis would remain
unaected if, for the mechanism design problem in Section 5.1, we replaced the Bayes-Nash
incentive constraints by the more demanding incentive constraints in (7).
It has been shown by Ledyard (1978) and Bergemann and Morris (2005) that ex post in-
centive compatibility is a necessary and sucient condition for the robust implementability of
an allocation rule, or social choice function. Robustness here refers to the specication of the
individuals' probabilistic beliefs about the environment; that is, an outcome is robustly imple-
mentable if we can implement it whatever the probabilistic beliefs of individuals look like. We
chose a particular specication of beliefs, namely the one which is implied by a common prior
according to which the types of dierent individuals are independent and identically distributed
random variables. The observation that the optimal mechanism is ex post incentive compatible
implies that these assumptions can be substantially weakened. In fact, every possible specica-
tion of the individuals' beliefs would give rise to the same result, provided that the mechanism
designer's beliefs remain unaltered.
5.4 A large economy
Our main result in Proposition 1 shows that, for an economy with an arbitrary, but nite
number of individuals, the optimal mechanism is equivalent to an optimal Mirrleesian income
tax. This result is based on the interpretation of f as a probability distribution from which
the individuals' types are drawn. This implies, in particular, that the budget constraint in the
Mirrleesian model is interpreted as a constraint which requires that the budget is balanced in
expectation, but not necessarily for each possible type prole. The following Proposition uses
the law of large numbers in order to show that, in a large economy, we can interpret f also as
the the empirical cross-section distribution of types in the economy as a whole.




n . For every " > 0, and every  > 0, there exists N so that n > N implies
Pn(j 1
n(w)   f1 j< ";j 2
n(w)   f2 j< ";:::;j m
n (w)   fm j< ")   :
An immediate implication of this Proposition is that, in an arbitrarily large, nite economy, ex
post budget balance holds almost surely. This is stated formally in the following Corollary.








n(w)(Ck   Y k)  
Pm
k=1 fk(Ck   Y k) j> ") :
Proposition 2 implies that, for every " > 0, limn!1 Pn(IM(")) = 0.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have provided a rationale for the use of simple mechanisms in problems of
social insurance, or redistributive income taxation. Simple mechanisms separate the provision
of working incentives to any one individual from the provision of working incentives to other
individuals. The main result of the paper shows that, under an assumption of decreasing risk
aversion, the optimal mechanism is a simple mechanism. Moreover, the optimal simple mecha-
nism is equivalent to an optimal income tax in the Mirrleesian model of income taxation.
Versions of this result are likely to carry over to other allocation problems. We illustrate
this by means of two examples. First, consider a monopolistic rm who sells a private good to
n consumers with private information on their willingness to pay. With a general mechanism
design approach it is possible to make the quantity sold to and the price paid by a consumer i
dependent on the willingness to pay of some other consumer j. A straightforward adaptation of
the arguments in this paper show that if (i) the rm has a constant returns to scale technology
and, (ii) agents with a low willingness to pay are not more risk-loving than agents with a high
willingness to pay, then this option will not be attractive for a prot-maximizing rm. Instead,
the rm will use a simple pricing mechanisms.
Second, consider an organization with n risk-averse agents/ employees and one risk-neutral
principal/ employer. For each agent, the principal observes a performance measure which is
a noisy signal of the agent's eort. The question now is whether the wage contract of agent i
should be simple in the sense that the wage paid to i depends only on i's performance, or whether
there is a role for non-simple wage contracts that make the payment to i also dependent on j's
performance. Our analysis suggests that, if (i) the signals of dierent agents are stochastically
independent, and (ii) agents with bad outcomes are not more risk-loving than agents with good
outcomes, than the use of simple wage contracts will be optimal.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1: The relaxed mechanism design problem. Instead of looking at directly at the
mechanism design problem in Section 5.1, we rst study a relaxed mechanism design problem
that takes only local downward incentive compatibility constraints into account. More precisely,
we consider the problem of choosing (ci)n
i=1 and (yi)n
i=1 in order to maximize ES subject to the
feasibility constraint in (6) and the following subset of all Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
constraints: For all i, all k > 1, and all h < k,
Ew i[U(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wk)]  Ew i[U(ci(w i;wh);yi(w i;wh);wk)] :
Lemma 1 Let (ci;yi)n
i=1 be a feasible and locally downward incentive compatible mechanism.





13Then, there exists a collection of simple mechanisms (C;Y ) := (Ci;Yi)n




k=1, that satises the following properties:
i) The simple mechanisms are payo equivalent: For all i and k,
U(Ck
i ;Y k
i ;wk) = Ew i[U(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wk)] :




i ;wk)  U(Ch
i ;Y h
i ;wk) :














Proof As a rst step, we only adjust the mechanism for individual i, leaving (cj;yj) unaected






i by the equation Y k
i := Ew i[yi(w i;wk)], and dene Ck
i by the equation
U(Ck
i ;Y k
i ;wk) = Ew i[U(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wk)] : (8)
Construct a new mechanism ( ci;  yi) for individual i so that,  ci(w) = Ck
i and  yi(w) = Y k
j , when-
ever wi = wk. Whenever wi 6= wk, let  ci(w) = ci(w) and  yi(w) = yi(w). By construction, the
new mechanism satises payo equivalence. Because of decreasing risk aversion it also satises
local downward incentive compatibility: Equation (8) in conjunction with the assumption of
decreasing risk aversion implies that,
U(Ck
i ;Y k
i ;wl)  Ew i[u(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wl)] ; (9)
for all l > k. Moreover, by local downward incentive compatibility of (ci;yi)
Ew i[U(ci(w i;wk);yi(w i;wk);wl)]  Ew i[U(ci(w i;wl);yi(w i;wl);wl)] : (10)
Consequently, the new allocation is also locally downward incentive compatible. Finally, de-
creasing risk aversion implies that Ck
i < Ew i[ci(w i;wk)].
We can repeat this argument for every possible type of individual i. This yields a simple
mechanism (Ci;Yi) = (Ck
i ;Y k
i )m
k=1 satisfying payo equivalence, downward incentive compat-
ibility, Y k
i = Ew i[yi(w i;wk)], for all k and Ck
i  Ew i[ci(w i;wk)], for all k, with a strict




i ] < Ew[yi(w)   ci(w)].
Finally, to establish the Lemma, we repeat these arguments for all individuals.
14The proof of Lemma 1 is an adaptation of the proof of Lemma 5.2 in Hellwig (2007b) to the
given setup. It implies that for the analysis of the relaxed mechanism design problem we may
focus without loss of generality on simple mechanism. We therefore dene the following relaxed














subject to the downward incentive compatibility constraints, for all i, k > 1 and h < k,
U(Ck
i ;Y k
i ;wk)  U(Ch
i ;Y h
i ;wk) ; (11)







i )  0 : (12)




An interdependence of the simple mechanisms for two individuals i and j arises only via the
feasibility constraint. For each individual i, it must therefore be true that the simple mechanism
(Cs
i ;Y s
i ) = (Cks
i ;Y ks
i )m
















i ) is the expected payment of individual i. We refer to this
problem in the following as individual i's relaxed simple mechanism design problem. We denote
the expected utility level of individual i that results from a solution to this problem by Vi(Ti).
Individual i's relaxed simple mechanism design problem is equivalent to the \deterministic
relaxed income tax problem" studied in Hellwig (2007b). It is shown in Hellwig (2007b) that,
at a solution to i's problem, the constraint (13) holds as an equality. Any slack in this budget
constraint could be used to increase individual i's expected utility in an incentive compatible way.
This observation also implies that the budget constraint (12) for the relaxed simple mechanism
design problem holds as an equality. Otherwise, it was possible to reduce the expected payment
of some individual i, and use the additional resources to make this individual better o.
These observations imply that we can characterize the solution to the relaxed simple mech-
anism design problem via the following two stage procedure: rst, we solve for each individual
i the corresponding simple relaxed mechanism design problem, treating the expected transfer
payments (Ti)n
i=1 as given parameters. Second, we solve the transfer problem, i.e., we choose
(Ti)n
i=1 in order to maximize
Pn
i=1 Vi(Ti) subject to
Pn
i=1 Ti = 0.
15Step 2: Show that the solution to the relaxed mechanism design problem and the
solution of the mechanism design problem coincide. Given that Assumptions 2 and 3 are
satised, it is shown in Hellwig (2007b) that the solution to the deterministic relaxed income tax
problem is incentive compatible, and is hence a solution to the Mirrleesian income tax problem.
For our setting, this implies that a solution to individual i's relaxed simple mechanism design
problem is not only downward incentive compatible, but also upward incentive compatible, i.e.,
it satises for all k  1, and all l with m  l > k,
U(Ck
i ;Y k
i ;wk)  U(Cl
i;Y l
i ;wk) : (14)
This implies, in particular, that the solution to the relaxed mechanism design problem is up-
ward incentive compatible. It also proves that the solution to the mechanism design problem in
Section 5.1 is a simple mechanism.
Step 3: Show that the solution to the relaxed mechanism design problem and the
income tax problem coincide. Step 2 shows that each individual's relaxed simple mechanism
design problem solves a Mirrleesian income tax problem. Hence, we have that Vi(Ti) = S(Ti).
We can therefore rewrite the transfer problem as follows: choose (Ti)n
i=1 in order to maximize
Pn
i=1 S(Ti) subject to
Pn
i=1 Ti = 0. Under Assumption 1, the solution to this transfer problem
involves S0
(Ti) = S0
(Tj), and hence Ti = Tj, for any pair if individuals i and j. The solution
to the transfer problem therefore is such that, for all i, Ti = 0.
Hence, each individual's relaxed simple mechanism design problem solves a Mirrleesian in-
come tax problem with a revenue requirement of 0. This implies in particular, that the optimally
chosen simple mechanisms for dierent individuals are identical, and coincide with the solution
to the Mirrleesian income tax problem in Section 3.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We have that
Pn(j 1
n(w)   f1 j> ";j 2
n(w)   f2 j> ";:::) 
Pm
k=1 Pn(j k
n(w)   fk j> ")
 m maxk Pn(j k
n(w)   fk j> ") :
(15)




i=1 1(wi = wk)
n
;
where 1(wi = wk) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if wi = wk, and takes the value
0 otherwise. Also note that E[k(w)] = fk. By the strong law of large numbers, for every k,
and every ~  > 0, there exists ~ N so that n > ~ N implies that
Pn(j k
n(w)   fk j> ")  ~  : (16)
Now, if let ~  = 
m and use (16) to substitute for maxk Pn(j k
n(w)   fk j< ") in (15), we obtain
Pn(j 1
n(w)   f1 j> ";j 2
n(w)   f2 j> ";:::;j m
n (w)   fm j> ")   :
16